By Rudy
Barnes, Jr.
President
George W. Bush originated a U.S. strategy of military intervention in Islamic
cultures to counter terrorism. It has
not worked. Where U.S. or NATO forces
have intervened, they have been perceived as infidels and the common enemy of all
Muslims. A new strategy of containment is
necessary—one that will rely on Muslim indigenous forces as the “boots on the
ground” that use lethal force to counter terrorism in Islamic cultures.
Islamic
cultures in the Middle East and Africa are rife with sectarian and tribal
conflict that is endemic to their culture and interwoven with virulent forms of
fundamentalist Islam, or Islamism. While
President Obama has refused to acknowledge that ISIS is related to Islam, he
has acknowledged that it is “a twisted ideology” that cannot be defeated on the
battleground. It can only be defeated by
Muslims who undermine its legitimacy among young Muslims.
A
containment strategy acknowledges that direct confrontation with a threat is
not the best way to counter it, as was the case with the Soviet Union during
the Cold War. The primary strategic
objective was to build popular support for libertarian democracy and human
rights in communist regimes. The U.S.
has a similar strategic objective in Islamic nations today, and to achieve it legitimacy (public perceptions of what
is right) is the center of gravity in any conflict.
The
challenge for the U.S. is to reconcile Islamist standards of legitimacy with libertarian
democracy, human rights and a secular rule of law. That creates a daunting challenge for U.S. advisers and trainers in Islamic cultures. They must
report violations of fundamental human rights while respecting local standards
of legitimacy that conflict with human rights in order to gain the trust and
confidence of their Muslim counterparts.
It can be a mission impossible.
The
Islamist standards of legitimacy that encumber U.S. advisers and trainers don’t
apply to U.S. military strikes in which there is little contact with the local
population. Both direct action strikes
and training and advisory missions are conducted by Special Operations Forces
(SOF), but they require very different skills.
Direct action SOF warriors need only combat skills, while advisers and trainers must be diplomat-warriors to achieve mission success.
The
diplomat-warriors of SOF must have language skills and knowledge of local culture
and standards of Islamic law (shari’a) to navigate the treacherous human
terrain of hostile Islamic cultures. In many
Islamic nations, apostasy and blasphemy laws preclude the fundamental freedoms
of religion and speech, and women and non-Muslims are often denied equal
treatment under the law. This makes it a
real challenge for SOF diplomat-warriors to promote fundamental human rights with
Muslims whose religious laws deny those rights.
If
the U.S. adopts a containment strategy for the Middle East and Africa, there
will be no large deployments of U.S. combat forces to compromise legitimacy and
undermine public support. A relatively
few SOF with cultural and language skills can keep a low profile as they advise
and assist indigenous forces conduct military operations and promote
fundamental human rights. It is a strategy
based on a politics of reconciliation with Muslims in Islamic cultures.
Experiences
in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq have been painful lessons learned in
legitimacy for the U.S. military. They
have taught us that superior military force can never compensate for a lack of
legitimacy when public support is essential to mission success. That is especially true in Islamic cultures where
shari’a shapes the standards of legitimacy, since it conflicts with libertarian
concepts of democracy, human rights and the secular rule of law.
The
“twisted ideology” of ISIS is a radical form of Islamism that has motivated
young Muslims to take up the cause of ISIS; and since it cannot be defeated on
the battlefield, its ideology must be undermined by Muslims committed to make
mainstream Islam a religion of peace and justice rather than one of violence
and oppression. Those moderate Muslims are
our most important allies in defeating the threat of radical Islamism, and the
presence of large deployments of U.S. combat forces only aids and abets Islamist
terrorists. It supports their propaganda
that the infidels of the West are at war with Islam and justifies their Jihad
(holy war).
When
public support is needed for U.S. strategic political objectives, military legitimacy
requires that might must be considered
right by those who are subjected to it.
When LBJ deployed U.S. Marines to Vietnam in 1965 he transformed what
was then a U.S. advisory mission into a U.S. war and undermined U.S. military
legitimacy in Vietnam. President Bush made
a similar strategic error when he invaded Iraq.
The military intervention created a political vacuum that the U.S. was
unable to fill, making it another painful lesson in legitimacy.
A
containment strategy that emphasizes military legitimacy can prevent such
strategic errors in the future. It is a
strategy that emphasizes reconciliation rather than violent engagement with
Islam, and it can undermine radical Islamism and promote lasting peace with
justice.
Notes:
On President Obama’s acknowledgement
that ISIS is a “twisted ideology” that cannot be defeated on the battleground,
see https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-islamic-state-will-inevitably-be-defeated-but-networks-will-persist/2016/08/04/18198978-5a5d-11e6-8b48-0cb344221131_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines&wpmm=1.
An earlier version of this topic
is at http://www.jesusmeetsmuhammad.com/2015/11/a-containment-strategy-to-defeat.html.
On religion, violence and military legitimacy, see http://www.jesusmeetsmuhammad.com/2014/12/religion-violence-and-military.html.
On Oppresso de liber: Where religion and military power intersect, see
http://www.jesusmeetsmuhammad.com/2015/05/de-oppresso-liber-where-religion-and.html.
On the causes of religious violence and how to combat them, see http://www.jesusmeetsmuhammad.com/2016/04/the-causes-of-religious-violence-and.html.
On religious violence and the dilemma of freedom and democracy, see http://www.jesusmeetsmuhammad.com/2016/04/religious-violence-and-dilemma-of.html.
On human rights and legitimacy in the SOF advisory and training mission,
see Barnes, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3gvZV8mXUp-eVRlcWFENHNUVUE/view.
Generally on military legitimacy,
see Barnes, Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium,
at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3gvZV8mXUp-VmpMUV9sSU9kaDA/view.
Generally on religion, legitimacy and the law: shari’a, democracy and human rights,
see https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B4qPfb4MvEswV2ZHS3hyWTcwbmc/view.